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Key findings
• Environmental tipping points occur when there are step changes 
in the way the biophysical world works – whether loss of soil 
fertility, collapse of a fishing stock, or sudden changes in weather 
patterns, such as those that caused the grasslands in North 
Africa to become deserts, 6000 years ago. These non-linear shifts 
arise following a critical degree of change, resulting from either 
many small cumulative changes or one large shock, “tipping” the 
system over a threshold and into a new stable state. Entering an 
alternative stable state is associated with a change to system 
function, usually being difficult to reverse or “tip” back into the 
original state. Increasingly we recognise that human-environment 
interactions are affecting the likelihood that critical thresholds 
for tipping points will be crossed, leading to step-changes in the 
provision of environmental goods and services, and impacting 
upon food security.
• This report provides evidence that tipping points in environmental 
systems do occur and that they could have significant effects 
on food security. Agri-food systems rely on the maintenance 
of function of a wide range of supporting systems (soil, water, 
climate, as well as biodiversity-related services like pollination and 
natural pest suppression); sudden changes in function associated 
with tipping points in climate, weather, soil health or biodiversity 
may have profound effects, at least at some scale. 
• Extreme events – such as widespread droughts - in the 
natural environment have been shown to perturb our globally 
interconnected food markets, and have contributed to food 
price spikes (in combination with other factors such as export 
restrictions). Crossing an environmental tipping point has the 
potential to contribute to market effects in a similar way, but 
with the perturbation being long-lived or even permanent. Even 
“local” tipping points (for example the possibility of a dustbowl 
in East Anglia or a fisheries collapse) can contribute to supply 
shortfalls and have potential to prompt food price spikes. Global 
scale tipping points such as collapse of the Atlantic Meridional 
Overturning Circulation could permanently change supply in an 
unprecedented way, through harsher winters and a strengthening 
of the winter storm track across the UK and Western Europe, 
together with hotter, drier and less windy summers.
• Economic systems are like natural systems in having feedback 
loops, non-linear behaviour and tipping points. We do not 
currently know enough about the interaction of biological and 
socio-economic systems to know whether they will amplify or 
dampen each other’s tipping points. The present paradigm that 
trade is typically beneficial is based on the assumption that an 
open trading system will dampen shocks, and this is true for 
small shocks. But as potential shocks - from evolving weather and 
potential tipping points - increase in magnitude, frequency and 
longevity, the confidence with which this assumption is made 
may be tested. More research is needed to better understand the 
risks.
• One potential early warning indicator of an approaching tipping 
point is increasing volatility, as behaviour of the system “flickers” 
close to tipping and prior to a permanent change to a “new 
normal”. More research is needed to be able to characterise and 
anticipate the reaching of critical thresholds in ways that are 
trusted enough to prompt action.
• If predictions about critical thresholds and when we might cross 
them are trusted, the pathways to mitigate crossing the tipping 
point are understood (for example, avoiding over-fishing, or 
improving soil health or de-carbonising the economy), and public 
policies do not distort market responses, then an environmental 
tipping point could lead to a smooth market response and no 
price spikes in food.
• However, the market does not often work to “perfectly price” and 
governments do intervene in ways that distort market responses 
(such as reducing exports during a food price spike). There is a 
clear need for the potential risks of crossing tipping points to 
be understood more widely, and for consideration of potential 
actions to mitigate and adapt to these. 
• It may be possible to undertake an in-depth cost-benefit 
analysis. This might inform whether adapting to a “new normal” 
or mitigating the tipping point in advance of crossing it is 
economically preferable. However, many of the options are 
deeply political, or geo-political, in nature and it may be that the 
actions taken are not those predicted by a cost-benefit analysis.
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Introduction
What is this report about?
Environmental tipping points occur when there are step changes in 
the way the biophysical world works – whether loss of soil fertility, 
collapse of a fishing stock, or sudden changes in weather patterns, 
such as those that caused the grasslands in North Africa to become 
deserts, 6000 years ago. These non-linear shifts move biophysical 
systems into a new stable state and a new way of functioning, 
often being difficult to reverse or “tip” back into the original state. 
Increasingly we recognise that human-environment interactions 
are affecting the likelihood that critical thresholds for tipping 
points will be crossed, leading to step-changes in the provision of 
environmental goods and services. However, these thresholds may 
be difficult to predict, and, because of the complexity of human-
environment interactions, difficult to mitigate or adapt to due to 
their unpredictability, scale and magnitude. Despite this, there is 
significant need to understand and manage any tipping point and 
the associated environmental change as this could have profound 
effects for global food security, especially as the global population 
grows and food demand increases. It is therefore critical to 
understand how food systems are impacted by environmental tipping 
points and what options exist to mitigate these risks at global to local 
levels.
This report considers whether tipping points, if passed, might affect 
the food system, through changing prices, social transformations, 
and availability, thereby undermining progress towards food security. 
We suggest that the potential consequences of passing tipping 
points is not receiving the attention it needs perhaps because (a) 
the science is uncertain and they seem too “unlikely”, or because 
the hazard seems regionally localised, so the risk to the global food 
system is judged to be low. We explore these issues and highlight 
the growing evidence for the existence of tipping points. Given the 
global interconnectivity of climate, and the associated global-scale 
risks associated with climate change, coupled with the increasing 
connectivity of the global food system, tipping points may present a 
real risk to global food security. We then explore potential solutions 
to reduce the hazards identified through market- and policy-based 
mechanisms.
For whom is this report?
This report is for stakeholders in the food system that have an interest 
in risk management. This includes the agri-food industries, as well as 
investors and (re-)insurance, and academic and policy communities. 
This report emerged from an inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral 
working group, and part of our aim is to encourage disparate 
academic as well as policy and business communities to appreciate 
the interplay between the non-linear dynamics of biophysical systems 
and the socio-economic systems that underpin societal health and 
well-being.
Food systems and shocks
The term “food system” encompasses the entirety of the production, 
transport, manufacturing, retailing, consumption, and waste of 
food, and their impacts on nutrition, health and well-being and 
the environment (Fig 1). For most countries in the world, the food 
Figure 1.  A representation of “the food system”.
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system is highly complex. For example, the UK imports food from 168 
countries (about 85% of the world’s countries) (Defra, 2012), and 
in total, over half of the UK’s food-and-feed requirements are met 
from imports. If the total area required to grow crops for the UK food 
system is estimated, over two-thirds of our land footprint is overseas 
(de Ruiter et al., 2016). 
Whilst there is a very large diversity of produce from agriculture, 
there is a concentration of production into a relatively small handful 
of commodity crops. Over 85% of the world’s calories come from 
wheat, rice , maize, sugar, barley, soy, palm, and potato (Cassidy et 
al., 2013), which are geographically concentrated in a small number 
of regions (Foley et al., 2011). The concentration of commodity crops 
into a relatively few, highly productive, regions leads to international 
trade networks that are growing in complexity as volumes of trade 
increase (Fig 2) (Puma et al., 2015).
The food system today, therefore, is highly global and increasingly 
complex (Puma et al., 2015). As food production requires land, water, 
labour, and infrastructure (MacDonald et al., 2015), a perturbation 
to any of these can affect the network of trade and, depending on 
a range of interaction factors (policy, stock-to-use ratios, severity 
of perturbation, poverty and vulnerability), can propagate through 
the system and ultimately change prices over the world. Whilst price 
changes can be beneficial in signalling the need for compensatory 
changes in production, price changes that markedly amplify the price 
signal can have negative local and global consequences, particularly 
affecting poor people and also the environment through increasing 
agricultural production more than is required1 (Puma et al., 2015; 
Tamea et al., 2016). 
A globalised trading system is often seen as beneficial. Each country 
can produce what they excel at, exploiting their own comparative 
advantages, export any surplus, and use that revenue to import 
what they do not produce. It also increases the resilience of the 
whole system to small perturbations: a loss in one region can be 
compensated for by a surplus in another delivered through the 
market. Local food security2 depends on a complementary interaction 
between local and international production but crucially with the 
market operating efficiently. However, as was seen with the food 
price spikes last decade, it is possible for the market to amplify supply-
side worries (through a range of mechanisms) which can lead to 
significant and untoward outcomes as rapid price rises may act as a 
risk multiplier. This may lead to reduced availability of food, especially 
for global and local poor, and potentially to increasing hunger or food 
poverty and their associated problems. Rapidly rising prices can also 
destabilise fragile national economies. Reliance on global markets 
can thus carry a systemic risk (Centeno et al., 2015; Puma et al., 
2015). The risk of such market failure may well be proportional to the 
size of any initial supply shortfall. 
Figure 2.  Representations of the international trade networks for wheat (top) 
and rice (bottom).  From Puma et al. 2015.
Markets are supposedly designed to enable demand and supply 
to reach equilibrium via changing prices. The responsiveness of 
price is thus important in signalling the need to increase or reduce 
production. However, when events interact (e.g. a perturbation, low 
stocks, and geo-political instability) it is possible for markets to over 
amplify the demand-supply imbalance and not reach equilibrium. 
Given the systemic risk associated with the amplification of price 
spikes it is important to consider the food system’s resilience 
to perturbations wherever and whenever they happen: will a 
perturbation, especially a large-scale one, create market failure as 
well as induce further social inequality? 
In recent years, there has been consideration of the role of weather 
in creating perturbations to the food system3. An extreme weather 
event may create a production shock, but, all things being equal, it 
will be temporary. Another form of perturbation can occur that may 
have permanent impacts: when a critical point – a tipping point - is 
passed. These are the focus of this paper: if there is a risk of a major, 
difficult-to-reverse perturbation, to the food system, how should we 
respond?
 
1 http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/extreme-weather-resilience-of-global-food-system.pdf
2 Broadly, access to safe, affordable nutritious food for a healthy life, for all and at all times
3 http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/extreme-weather-resilience-of-global-food-system.pdf
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Part 1: Setting out the issues
Resilience and tipping points: a primer.
Imagine a farmer’s field, growing a single crop. Over the years, 
intensification of farming has led to increases in yields, with weather 
typically driving variation around this trend, but, on average, yield 
variation is manageable relative to what is expected. The system 
is quite resilient, and farmers can plan their operations because 
they understand this variability. However, imagine if, over time, 
agricultural intensification has gradually reduced some property 
of the soil making it less stable to weather; and, at the same time, 
climate change is causing an increase in extreme rainfall events. 
Under these circumstances, is possible to imagine an intense rainfall 
event capable of washing soil away to the extent that yields are 
permanently affected. This would be a prolonged change as it might 
take decades or hundreds of years to replenish the soil . It would be a 
“tipping point” or “critical transition” creating a step-change in system 
function. 
The state of a system can be assessed by some important functional 
variables. These include agricultural yields for farming, or food prices, 
or availability for food systems. A resilient system is one where these 
functional variables may vary, but essentially, they remain within 
“normal” bounds. A farmer can cope with year-to-year variability 
in yields in terms of a few percent, or a consumer with variability 
in prices of a similar magnitude. Resilient systems (see glossary) 
are those that are stable in the sense that they are robust to 
perturbations (moving relatively little for a given perturbation), and/
or quick to return to a pre-perturbation functional state. Non-resilient 
systems are those that, once perturbed, take a long time to, or even 
never, return to the pre-perturbed state. The key characteristic of a 
tipping point is that there is a transition to a “new normal” that is not 
easy to reverse. The alternative state is perversely resilient. If a lake is 
gradually enriched it may suddenly switch from clean water to turbid 
(see below). In this case, a small reduction in nutrients will reduce 
the nutrient load to below the “forward critical threshold”, but will 
not change the water back to clear. The “backward critical threshold” 
requires that nutrients have to be reduced to very low levels before 
the system can “tip back” to the clean state. When an incremental 
driver (e.g. nutrients, atmospheric CO2, soil carbon, fishing intensity) 
creates a forward tip at a different level than the reverse backwards 
tip, it is termed hysteresis (see glossary). Some tipping points lead to 
a state of true irreversibility – such as when a species goes extinct. 
Hence, tipping points can be conceived as going from one resilient 
state to another, and that alternative stable state may not be 
desirable.
Within an agricultural system, we are interested in its function: 
producing yield. This arises from a combination of input variables 
(seed, soil, nutrients, climate, and management). In dynamic systems 
theory, the current state of a system can be described by the position 
of a ball to represent how it currently “functions” (e.g. the yield at 
a given time). Imagine the ball on a surface with lots of dips and 
humps. Mathematically, this surface is defined by combinations of 
variables; for example, in an agricultural scenario these variables 
may be soil quality and climate. Perturbations to the system (such 
as unusual weather) provide knocks to the ball, which will randomly 
move it away from its resting position. If the surface is not flat, the 
ball will end up in a dip, and small perturbations will not provide 
enough of a kick to move it out of the dip, so, on average, it stays 
in the same place: it is locally stable (Fig 3). In other words, certain 
combinations of variables make agricultural functioning stable (e.g. 
good soils in fertile plains are likely to be high yielding over time, 
mountain tops with poor soils are likely to be permanently low 
yielding) and others may make agriculture unstable (e.g. shifting 
monsoon belts). 
Resilience: how does a system respond to a perturbation?
The resilience of the system – how stable it is - depends on the shape 
of the dip: all things being equal, a steeper sided dip requires more 
of a kick to move the ball, and it will return to being motionless at 
the bottom faster than a shallow sided dip (Fig 3A vs 3B). If there 
are multiple stable states (Fig 3C), the lip between adjacent dips 
represents a tipping point: a small perturbation will move the ball 
up the side of the dip, but it will roll back (Fig 3C first black arrow in 
inset graph). If the perturbation pushes the ball over the lip it will roll 
into the next cup, and it will undergo a critical transition between 
alternative stable states (Scheffer et al., 2012).
The world is changing all the time, so the static cartoons in Fig 3 are 
inadequate. Environmental or social change will lead to changes in 
the shape of the surface, and thus the system’s resilience. As a cup 
disappears, under some gradual environmental change, the system 
gets more unstable, and even small perturbations can lead to the 
crossing of a tipping point (Figure 4).
Agricultural yields arise from the intersection of management with 
natural systems. Agriculture can tip from a stable, resilient and 
economical state to an uneconomical one in multiple ways. For 
example, through environmental change (such as climate change 
  4 Land prices in 1930s “Dustbowl” counties remain depressed to this day.
Figure 3.  Cartoons illustrating the concept of resilience.  The state of the 
system is the “ball” and the shape of the cup describes its resilience to a 
perturbation.  A) high resilience, (B) low resilience, (C) a sufficiently large 
perturbation can push the cup over a threshold – a tipping point – into a 
new stable state.
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reducing agricultural suitability), sudden natural events (e.g. soil loss) 
or even socio-technological change (e.g. if pesticides are banned, 
or when labour is lost, or the market for a given product disappears, 
perhaps because it can be produced more cheaply somewhere else).
For those interested in food system resilience, tipping points are 
important for three reasons. First, the world is changing through 
changing climate and environmental transformation. Global 
intensification results in greater yields coming from the same land, 
and potentially at the same time, widespread degradation of soil 
and biodiversity. In essence, there is potential for these driving 
variables to be changing the shape of the cups (Fig 4a). Second, 
the world’s weather is changing and what was once extreme 
weather is becoming more common. This means there is potential 
for environmental perturbations to the agri-food system to become 
larger. Larger perturbations increase the likelihood of knocking the 
ball out of the basin of attraction (Fig 3). Thirdly, as there was an 
excess of land, water and resources (“biophysical redundancy”) in 
the past, these could buffer countries against global perturbations to 
food supplies. This has been reducing in recent decades on a global 
basis (Marianela et al., 2016). Nowadays, countries rely on global 
trade in agricultural produce for their own food systems to function 
(Puma et al., 2015). Whilst this is highly beneficial in spreading risk, it 
creates a systemic risk in wider geographic exposure to risks. If every 
country were isolated and self-sufficient, only local risks matter. If 
every country is connected by trade, and through labour movements, 
a large enough perturbation in one place, especially if price signals 
are over-amplified, could create impacts across the world. A new dust 
bowl event, affecting long-term yields in a breadbasket region, could 
have consequences for us all.
Are tipping points really worth worrying about?
To date, most consideration of agri-food system sustainability and 
resilience is based on “linear thinking”. This can be characterised as 
(a) “small, incremental changes have small incremental effects” and 
(b) “it is as easy to move backwards and restore system functioning 
as it is to move forwards and reduce system functioning”. Tipping 
points exemplify a non-linear world; it is possible incrementally to 
drive a system – perhaps through increasingly intense farming – to a 
zone that suddenly switches from one state to another, from which it 
is difficult to recover. 
In the literature there are many examples of tipping points (also 
called regime shifts) between stable states in environmental and 
socio-environmental systems (Walker and Meyers, 2004) (Beisner et 
al., 2003; Scheffer and Carpenter, 2003), including agro-ecological 
systems. We collate some of these in Appendix A –they include 
events like the mid-West Dustbowl, desertification through over-
grazing, forest clearing driving local climate change and causing a 
“switch” from forest to grassland, and shifts in climate that cause the 
collapse of agriculture and societies.
The examples of tipping points have typically occurred at relatively 
small scales, especially with respect to terrestrial ecological systems 
(Brook et al., 2013). This is often taken to imply that tipping points 
are unlikely to be important at a global scale. For example, Brook 
et al (2013) say, “Although there is convincing evidence that 
human drivers can cause regime shifts at local and regional scales, 
the increasingly invoked concept of planetary scale tipping points 
Fig. 4a. The stability of the system may change over time or depend on a driving variable. Here, a driving variable (e.g. nutrient levels in a lake) changes smoothly 
from bottom to top, and as it does, the basin of attraction (the cup) changes shape. Initially, the ball is in the right hand basin and is very resilient (the time taken 
for the system to return to equilibrium is proportional to tau, the radius of the basin). As the nutrient levels increase, the current state becomes less resilient until 
there is a sudden change and the ball rolls into the left-hand cup. SOURCE: (Lenton et al., 2008), ©National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. In this example, the 
right hand cup is the natural state with clear water, and the left hand cup is the nutrient-rich state with algal blooms making the water turbid and reducing the 
natural biodiversity. This critical transition can be experimentally induced, as shown in Fig 4b, where nutrients have been added below the curtain dividing the 
lake (http://sevenhillslake.com/technical.html).
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in the terrestrial biosphere remains unconfirmed. By evaluating 
potential mechanisms and drivers, we conclude that spatial 
heterogeneity in drivers and responses, and lack of strong continental 
interconnectivity, probably induce relatively smooth changes at the 
global scale, without an expectation of marked tipping patterns.” 
However, the atmosphere and climate system has potential to create 
“strong continental connectivity” and create tipping points with 
planetary-scale impacts (Hughes et al., 2013; Lenton and Williams, 
2013), through changes in the ocean and atmospheric circulation 
creating changes in global weather. Another example might be the 
gradual warming and acidification of the oceans that may create 
a collapse of coral reef ecosystems across the tropics over the next 
decades. Furthermore, our globalised world (Hughes et al., 2013) has 
the potential to create global connectivity through the movement of 
goods, technologies, people or practices. For example, the spread of 
a pathogen attacking a common crop plant (such as UG99) (Singh 
et al., 2011); or intensification of agricultural production worldwide 
causing widespread soil degradation with the potential for sudden 
loss of soil function across multiple areas. 
Agriculture and fisheries are an intimate interplay between socio-
economic and environmental systems, so a tip in an environmental 
system may have significant consequences for the socio-economic 
system that utilises it. In addition, socio-economic systems are 
often highly complex and have multiple feed-back links, direct and 
indirect, that can create non-linear dynamics and sudden switches 
in behaviour (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union (Patrick et 
al., 2011)). It is an open question for research about whether the 
interaction of biological and socio-economic systems will amplify or 
damp each other’s tipping points. 
However, given the importance of food systems for the stability 
of socio-economic systems more broadly, the degree to which 
environmental tipping points may drive changes in the food 
system is perhaps particularly important to consider. While the 
global system may be resilient to small-scale shocks arising from 
changes in agricultural production at a local scale, the spatial 
inter-connectedness that arises through trade and geopolitical 
relationships makes each individual country potentially more exposed 
to larger cascading risks (Puma et al., 2015; Jessica et al., 2016; 
Philippe et al., 2016). 
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Key questions
Whilst there is a huge literature on sustainability in agri-food systems, 
and a growing literature on resilience, there is little consideration of 
the potential for critical transitions to affect food production and 
food systems. Part of this comes from a lack of knowledge of the 
potential for tipping points to exist, and at what scale, and whether 
crossing them is likely. For example, a common scientific result is to 
observe that biodiversity or an ecosystem service (“soil health”, or 
equitable climate) is in decline. From this, many people extrapolate 
linearly from the current state to the zero state many years ahead, 
and then infer that a linear rate of decline requires no urgent action. 
Instead, the key question should be whether the decline in service is 
moving the system closer to a non-linear threshold, beyond which the 
functionality will suddenly decline.
To assess the relevance of tipping points to food systems necessitates 
addressing the following questions:
• Would passing tipping point(s) influence important aspects of the 
food system (e.g. prices)?5  
• If so how would this happen? 
• How can we avoid this, and ensure the market is aware of such 
tipping points and has appropriate mechanisms with which to 
respond?
To begin to address these questions, we explore a set of case study 
scenarios for tipping points. These include an example of one past 
(collapse of a fishery), two that may currently be happening (soil 
salinization, aridification) and two plausible ones that could happen 
(a dustbowl and a big climatic shift); the plausible ones we explore in 
some detail in terms of thinking about mitigation and/or adaptation 
strategies.
We do not aim to be alarmist and sketch yet another version of 
the “apocalyptic tragedy” narrative (Foust and O’Shannon Murphy, 
2009). We want to examine the implications of known biophysical 
phenomena for the socio-economic system that we each rely on 
daily. A recent review of the results of the family of climate models 
used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
community, shows a significant number of occasions, under future 
emissions scenarios, of abrupt and non-linear changes in climate 
and weather systems (Drijfhout et al., 2015). Were such a sudden 
change in weather patterns to occur, how would our food system 
respond? If we can predict such an event happening decades in 
advance, could the market respond to prevent it, or at least lessen its 
impacts, and what help would be needed from policy? How can we 
avoid an environmental tipping point leading to a step-change in an 
important food-system variable (such as price or availability)? 
5 The focus of this document is from environment to food systems, and there are equally valid questions about how socio-economic tipping points might feed onto the environment.  
Another question which we don’t address is “when does increasingly integrated and open trading introduce new tipping points by increasing the complexity of a nation’s food 
system?”. 
It is possible to understand the future impacts of currently 
unsustainable behaviour and act to prevent the apocalyptic future. 
In essence, this is the positive outcome of the “ozone hole” story. 
Following identification of the ozone hole and the consequences 
of its growth, research indicated its cause was chlorofluorocarbon 
(CFCs) compounds (Crutzen and Arnold, 1986). From this came the 
Montreal Protocol and the banning of >100 industrial chemicals 
(Andersen, 2015), resulting in significant emissions reductions and 
signs of recovery of ozone (Swanson and Mason, 2003; de Laat et al., 
2015). The counterfactual to this is what would be the situation now 
if the scientific warnings had gone unheeded?
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Case studies – real and plausible – of tipping points 
affecting the food system
Figure 5.  The rise and fall of the Newfoundland cod fishery.  Illustration 
by Lamiot, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.
php?curid=10648302.
Example 1. Collapse of exploited populations: 
Newfoundland cod as an example
The northern Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) fishery off southern 
Labrador and to the northern Grand Bank of Newfoundland was 
once the largest cod fishery in the world. Its collapse “was a social 
and economic disaster for the region” (Myers and Cadigan, 1995) 
– an example of where an environmental tipping point drove a 
step-wise change in the socio-economic system. The rise, decline 
and fall of the fishery is illustrated in Fig 5. There were two major 
eras in recent decades (Hamilton et al., 2004): when stocks were 
abundant and when they collapsed. In the former, industrialisation 
of fishing occurred when open boats using lines switched to trawling 
(in the late 1960s) leading to a boom time with high returns, and 
further investment in dragnets, which increased fish bycatch. From 
the late 1980s, stocks collapsed, forcing societal change. The 1994 
moratorium meant that 400 fish plant workers lost their jobs. In 
2003, the cod fishery closed down. Increasing dependence on 
government assistance meant many young people left the area 
for education or employment. Stocks are now beginning to recover, 
and are currently about 20% the size of the late 1980s (Rose and 
Rowe, 2015). It will take another decade or more of recovery before 
the fishery can be re-opened – a 40 year hiatus, much longer than 
initially expected.
Overfishing was the primary cause of a decline of fish stocks. 
However, climatic conditions also had a role (Drinkwater, 2002), 
with cold conditions reducing growth rates and recruitment of adult 
fish for a decade. Furthermore, size-selected mortality (the largest, 
most fecund, fish are preferentially caught) suppressed recruitment 
when the fishing industry relied on recruitment rates to restore fish 
populations. Population models, and some circumstantial evidence 
from other population collapses in cod fisheries (De Roos and 
Persson, 2002; Gårdmark et al., 2015), suggest the non-recovery was 
partly due to the existence of an alternative stable state. When cod 
are common, the adults eat prey species, which would otherwise 
compete with the young cod for food. When adult cod become rare, 
the prey species become more common, increasing competition for 
young cod, reducing their ability to survive and grow, suppressing the 
population growth rate. 
From an industry perspective, the decline of cod stocks from their 
peak led to impacts on other parts of the marine ecosystem. 
Initially, fishing efforts switched to other fish species (e.g. redfish, 
Greenland halibut), but when these stocks declined (Hamilton et al. 
2004), fishing effort switched to invertebrates (e.g. northern shrimp, 
American lobster and snow crab). However, fewer licences were issued 
than had been available for cod fishing, as not all areas were suitable 
for crustacean fisheries. The ability of fishers to adapt depended on 
geography, their ability to invest, and also licensing/quota rules. 
The economic impacts of the collapse were felt beyond the region. 
The FAO’s capture fish price index rose by 20-40%6. This fishery 
collapse also highlighted the necessity to further ensure sustainable 
fisheries management, and inspired the development of the Marine 
Stewardship Council in 1997 to set global standards for sustainable 
fishing.
The socio-economic system acted in a number of ways to mitigate 
the impact of historical over-fishing, and potentially allow the stock 
to return from the “low equilibrium” to “high equilibrium” state. At 
the time of the collapse, the reduction in employment in the sector 
meant that overfishing would not continue. The likelihood of there 
being a lag in employment growth following a recovery in stocks 
means that the recovery is more effective. The increase in the market 
price also means that the demand for fish is reduced. In addition 
to the market impacts, the closure of the fishery coupled with other 
regulatory interventions from the marine stewardship council have 
also contributed.
6 see http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/fishery-information/resource-detail/en/c/338601/
In this section, we aim to examine five case studies of existing or plausible bio-physical tipping points that have or may have significant 
implications for local, regional or global food production. Each case study presents a scenario/description of the change in the 
environment and then addresses the question: what were or would be the consequences for the food system?
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Example 2. A tipping point in progress? Salinization of 
the Mekong Delta
The Mekong Delta, also known as Vietnam’s rice bowl, accounts for 
more than half of Vietnam’s rice and fruit production, 90% of its rice 
exports, 60% of its fishery exports and is home to 20 million people. 
Originating on the Tibetan Plateau and flowing through a number 
of countries before meeting the South China Sea in Vietnam, water 
levels in the Delta commonly drop during the dry season, allowing 
some temporary saltwater intrusion from the South China Sea before 
freshwater levels are bolstered when the rains come. 
Soils with too much salt in them become infertile; “salting the earth” 
was a Near East custom to signify the permanent destruction of 
an enemy society in ancient times7. Climate change is creating the 
potential for a significant tipping point through rapid salinization of 
the soils. This arises through two routes. First, as drought intensity 
increases, groundwater levels fall, allowing for greater saltwater 
intrusion from the sea. Secondly, as sea levels rise, the likelihood of 
salt-water inundation, as well as intrusion, increases. A sea-level rise 
of one metre is expected to submerge 40% of the delta, potentially 
rendering a great deal of agricultural land non-viable. The risk of 
catastrophic salinization is further enhanced by anthropogenic 
changes; damage to the region has also been brought about by 
infrastructure change, introduction of canals, dikes and dams as 
well as new water management and land use techniques. These 
negatively affect water levels (increasing extraction pressure 
downstream) and sediment movement (reducing silt deposition and 
thus making the delta more vulnerable to sea-level rise). 
The potential loss of soil functionality through salinization is 
exemplified by the 2015-16 “mega-drought” associated with the El 
Niño, leading to the lowest water levels in the lower Mekong since 
records began – down 30% to 50% compared to average levels. 
Lack of freshwater has allowed for greater and more prolonged 
saltwater intrusion – in April 2016, salt levels of four parts per 
thousand reached 50 kilometres inland, while groundwater was 
found to be tainted in rice paddies as far as 90 kilometres inland. 
As a result, 159,000 hectares of rice paddy has already been lost, 
with an estimated 500,000 hectares still likely to be damaged (10% 
of the nation’s arable land, and perhaps the most fertile). This loss 
to agriculture due to salinization and drought has the potential to 
threaten food security in Vietnam as well as impact international 
markets for key Vietnamese crops, such as rice, cassava, maize, 
coffee, and cashew nuts. It may also threaten the livelihoods of the 
20% of the Vietnamese population who depend on agriculture on 
the delta8.
Example 3: A tipping point in progress: Drought in 
California.
Another tipping point that may already be in progress is the drying 
of southwestern North America and the attendant consequences for 
regional food production, especially in California. 
Droughts have been a recurring feature of California’s climate. 
Significant droughts occurred in 1929-1934, 1976-1977, and 1987-
1992. This century, there was a less severe drought in 2007-2009. 
However, since 2012, California has faced a drought of extreme 
proportions, with record-high temperatures and record-low levels of 
snowpack and precipitation9. Climate observations and modelling 
suggests that the SW N America region (including parts of Mexico) is 
undergoing a transition to a more arid state, which may mimic past 
regional ‘mega-droughts’ in the paleo-record (e.g. those linked to the 
collapse of early civilisations) or even exceed them (Cook et al., 2015; 
Diffenbaugh et al., 2015) (Fig 6). 
Agriculture is a key industry in California, accounting for about 2% of 
the state’s economy. In the US, it is the leading producer (in terms of 
income), and produces more than 12% of US farm gate receipts. In 
2014, California’s 76,400 farms had a gross income of $54 billion10. 
The state of California is a major exporter (exporting $22bn by value, 
more than 14% of the US’s agricultural exports). California’s top 10 
export destinations are (in order) European Union ($3.7bn in 2014), 
Canada, China/Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Korea, India, United Arab 
7 E.g. “And Abimelech fought against the city all that day; and he took the city, and slew the people that was therein, and beat down the city, and sowed it with salt.” King James’ Bible 
Judges 9:45.
8 https://news.mongabay.com/2016/10/will-climate-change-sink-the-mekong-delta/
9 http://www.californiadrought.org/drought/background/
10 https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2015Report.pdf
Figure 6. Predictions of drought in Central and SW US up to 2100.  Top panel 
drought maps for 2050-99.  The predicted soil moisture balance time series 
over 1100 years for Central Plains (Middle panel) and SW US (bottom) shows 
development of unprecedented drought. From Cook et al (2015)
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Emirates, Turkey, and Vietnam. California is the US’s sole exporter 
of many commodities including table grapes, raisins, dried plums, 
kiwifruit, dates, olives and olive oil, figs, almonds, walnuts, pistachios, 
garlic, and artichokes. In terms of size of the agricultural economy, 
California is placed 5-9th (depending on the metric) in the global list, 
above countries like the UK, Canada and Germany11.
Drought clearly acts as a constraint to agricultural production. 
Estimates of the cost of drought in 2015 suggest a $2.7bn fall in 
revenue, with 21,000 job losses (Howitt et al., 2014). In 2014, over 
400,000 acres, about 6 percent of cropland, was left unused because 
of the drought12. In times of drought, reliance on water extracted 
from underground increases (as surface water becomes more scarce), 
rising from 40% of water used in non-drought years, to 65% in 
drought years. High levels of abstraction exceed the recharge rates, 
and as a consequence land subsidence in some areas can be very 
severe (up to 94cm in the period 2006-2010, and up to nearly 4cm a 
month in 201413). Whilst subsidence can itself cause significant costs 
(e.g. to roads, canals, flood risk), it reflects collapse of the aquifer and 
its water storage ability. 
 
The tipping point from a stable, equitable, agriculture-friendly 
historical climate regime to the current drought exemplifying the 
“new normal” will have significant impacts both on local production 
and perhaps on global food systems (given the global reliance on 
almonds and pistachios, grapes and raisins, and wine). From a water-
use perspective, the greatest volume of water used for irrigation is for 
forage (including alfalfa), underpinning livestock production (dairy 
in particular): forage uses some 4 times more water than almond 
and pistachio combined14. In addition, in recent years, and taking 
advantage of cheap shipping, the export of alfalfa from California 
has grown significantly, to the extent that in essence, a drought-
prone state is currently “exporting 100bn gallons of water to China”15. 
It is unlikely that changes in irrigation efficiency will materially affect 
water requirements (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2008). Hence, 
to make water usage sustainable within a long-term water-limited 
system implies significant changes in production area or crop type. 
This clearly has the potential to be both economically harmful and 
potentially sudden.
The geographical extent of aridification (Fig 6) extends beyond 
California. In Mexico, some 18% of people work in agriculture. 
An increasing lack of water, as well as intensifying heat, is likely to 
significantly impact on their production and farming practices (such 
as constraining double cropping). It may also lead to increased 
migration16. 
Example 4. A plausible local tipping point: soils and an 
East Anglian dustbowl. 
There is a potential tipping point in East Anglia with the degradation 
and loss of peat soils, creating conditions where widespread soil 
erosion may occur.
The East Anglian fenland peats cover a total area of 132,000 ha in 
the East of England. In Cambridgeshire, 70% of land is Grade 1 or 
2, compared to the average for England of 18%17, and it is under 
intensive cultivation of high value field vegetable and horticultural 
crops. Peat was originally formed in waterlogged conditions, prior to 
the fenland drainage that started in the 17th Century. 
Only 16% of the peat stock recorded in 1850 in the fens now 
remains; within this area, there are about 33,500 ha of remaining 
deep peats. Recent predictions suggest that peat cover – depending 
on climate scenario – will be gone within decades (Fig 7; from Graves 
and Morris, 2013; Oats, 2002).
 The loss of peat leads to a reduction in soil organic matter (SOM) 
and soil biodiversity caused by intensive cultivation has long-term 
detrimental effects on crop yield and susceptibility to erosion 
(Panagos et al., 2015; Rickson et al., 2015). Continued intensive 
agriculture leads to change in the in soil community from one 
dominated by fungi and earthworms binding soil aggregates 
together, to one dominated by more ephemeral species, such as 
bacteria, leading to the degradation of soil structure (Rillig and 
Mummey, 2006; Blankinship et al., 2016). In addition to increasing 
resilience to erosion, high carbon soils with good structure can hold 
more moisture and be more drought-resistant (Bhattacharyya et al., 
2016). During a long drought, any loss of structure is exacerbated 
and the organic soils become friable and so erosion risks – to both 
wind and rain - increases. The Fenland of East Anglia is one of the 
areas identified at highest risk of losing soil by wind erosion – greater 
than a 1 in 20 chance of exceeding 4 t ha-1 y-1, especially during 
drought (Kibblewhite et al., 2014). 
We consider a plausible scenario to be an unprecedented drought. 
Had it not rained in late spring 2012, breaking the prolonged drought 
of 2010-2012, this might represent such a scenario, coupled with 
loss of field crops (creating bare land during the summer), or a 
drought extending into winter when soils are typically bare. Under 
these conditions, any strong winds can drive erosion. In Kansas, wind 
erosion during the over-winter drought in 1995/6, lead to soil loss 
of 65 t ha-1. The highest rates of soil erosion recorded are 445 t ha-1 
(Montgomery, 2007), from a report published in 1950 on erosion in 
Western Iowa. The US Dustbowl of the 1930s was an environmental 
and economic disaster, in high-erosion areas, over 75% of topsoil 
11 Measure of Californian Agriculture (2009).  http://aic.ucdavis.edu/publications/moca/moca_current/moca09/moca09chapter5.pdf
12 https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/04/03/agriculture-is-80-percent-of-water-use-in-california-why-arent-farmers-being-forced-to-cut-back/
13 http://water.ca.gov/groundwater/docs/NASA_REPORT.pdf
14 http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/lcfssustain/hanson.pdf
15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26124989
16 http://archive.alleghenyfront.org/story/climate-change-forces-mexican-farmers-migrate.html
17 https://www.scambs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/13_NS%20Phase%201%20ES%20Agriculture_and_soil.pdf
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was lost in successive years, severely – and to this day – reducing land 
values (Hornbeck, 2009). 
The Fenland area is more fertile and used for higher value crops (like 
root vegetables) than much of the rest of England. Loss of fertility 
would reduce the ability to produce home-grown vegetables (East 
Anglia, accounts for about 29% of Great Britain’s area planted 
for potatoes18). Any loss of fertility would have economic impacts 
beyond farm revenues. The Cambridgeshire district of Fenland 
has twice the national average of businesses in agriculture19 (over 
12% of all business in the area are agricultural) which accounts for 
significant employment of poorly qualified and seasonal workers 
(where other employment opportunities are limited). In addition, 
suspended soil particles in a “dust storm” can have significant impacts 
on human health, traffic, business and domestic costs (through 
disrupted transport and cleaning requirements): a dust storm in 
New South Wales in September 2013 was estimated to have a total 
economic cost of A$300m (Tozer and Leys, 2013). 
Whilst this “plausible scenario” is chosen as a “local example” of a 
tipping point resulting in a step-wise change in agricultural yields, it 
is connected in two ways to the global system. First, drought is made 
more likely due to climate change. Second, the drivers of climate 
change and agricultural intensification both arise from growing 
global demand. High value agricultural land is degrading in the UK 
and elsewhere in Europe. If a drought is spatially widespread, then a 
significant wind-erosion event in the UK might be replicated on the 
continent. Thus loss of production for the entire food system may 
extend beyond local losses and may result in even more ephemeral 
employment conditions for migrant labourers. 
Example 5. A plausible large-scale climatic tipping point: 
collapse of the Atlantic overturning circulation
A potential future climate tipping point is a collapse of the Atlantic 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). This Atlantic branch 
of the global ocean’s ‘conveyor belt’ (thermohaline) circulation 
transports a large flux of heat northwards across the equator and 
on to the NE Atlantic region including Europe. Climate observations 
already show a ‘cold spot’ in the North Atlantic – the only place 
globally that is not warming – linked to an observed weakening of 
the AMOC. Models project further weakening of the AMOC as climate 
change continues, including a potential shut-off of deep convection 
in the Labrador Sea region to the west of Greenland; and, in more 
extreme scenarios, a complete collapse of the overturning circulation. 
Whilst in current models the latter requires sustained greenhouse gas 
emissions, there is some evidence that the models may be biased 
towards being too stable when compared to observations. 
Although there is little certainty as to whether the AMOC is likely 
to slow or stop in the foreseeable future, its strength has weakened 
considerably since the 1970s (Rahmstorf et al., 2015), and 
particularly in the last decade or so. It is therefore a plausible albeit 
“low probability-high impact event” for forthcoming decades. It would 
also be very difficult to reverse (carrying hysteresis). Were there to be 
significant change in the AMOC, it would happen over an uncertain 
timescale – from a decade to many decades.
As the “Gulf Stream” is drawn towards NW Europe by the overturning 
circulation, it is not surprising that AMOC collapse would reduce 
the temperate maritime nature of our climate in NW Europe, and 
18  http://potatoes.ahdb.org.uk/sites/default/files/publication_upload/GB%20Potatoes%202015-2016.pdf
19 http://cambridgeshireinsight.org.uk/file/1061/download
Fig 7. Estimated time in years for peat layer to be lost in East Anglia, The analysis presented in the Adaptation Sub-Committee (2013) draws on data developed 
by Graves and Morris (2013). The analysis assume an initial depth of 86 cm in 2012. The dark bars assumes a diminishing rate of peat loss with peat depth 
reduction and the lighter bars assume a constant rate of loss with peat depth reduction. The effect of climate change on peat loss is based on a no climate 
change scenario, a low emissions scenario and a high emissions scenario as presented by the UKCP09. The analysis draws on data that suggests that CO2 
emissions from peat increase by 30% for every one degree rise in temperature.
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provide some degree of similarity to similar latitudes in NE North 
America (e.g. Labrador). In other words, the key impacts of AMOC 
collapse would include a marked increase in seasonality of European 
climate with harsher winters (even in a globally warmer world) 
and a strengthening of the winter storm track across the UK and 
western Europe, together with hotter, drier and less windy summers. 
Simulations of AMOC collapse in the Hadley Centre climate model 
show a marked reduction in net primary productivity across Europe 
which would translate into a significant loss of crop yields (Jackson et 
al., 2015). 
Jackson et al.’s state-of-the-art model study simulated the slowing 
of the AMOC to about a third of its current strength. Their principal 
results, which they consider robust, include:
• Widespread cooling throughout the North Atlantic and northern 
hemisphere in general, with cooling in Europe of several degrees.
• Much greater sea ice coverage in the North Atlantic.
• Less precipitation and evaporation in the northern hemisphere 
mid-latitudes. Across Europe, summer precipitation generally 
decreases; however, there is an increase in precipitation around 
the Mediterranean. In winter, precipitation generally decreases, 
but with a greater proportion as snow, leading to an increase in 
duration of snow-cover. 
• Strengthening of the North Atlantic storm tracks, with a greater 
penetration of storms over land in Europe (leading to localised 
increases in winter precipitation associated with storms)
• Reduction in productivity of vegetation associated with changes 
in temperature, seasonality and water availability. 
Figure 8. The Spring (C) and Summer (D) change in productivity of grasses (as a proxy for crops) if the AMOC slowed down significantly. (from Jackson et al, 
2015 @ Crown Copyright, Met Office).
Further afield, AMOC collapse would cause a southward shift to the 
inter-tropical convergence zone causing potentially abrupt weakening 
of the Indian summer monsoon and for example, loss of irrigated 
rice, increased desertification in sub-Saharan Africa due to abrupt 
shift in the West African Monsoon, and drying over much of Brazil 
and Central America. Whilst the AMOC may collapse over a relatively 
long timescale, shifts in the monsoon systems could be more abrupt 
(Chang et al., 2008). 
Some of the impacts on food production are clear: loss of significant 
European crop and grassland production (Fig 8), perhaps as much 
as a third, extending across to Russia. In addition, significant losses 
of rice production in India, changes in rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and drying in Central S America, and the corresponding losses in 
productivity in soya and sugar. Were this to happen rapidly, this 
would cause unprecedented losses in global production. Recent 
estimates suggest that a 1-in-200 year extreme event, equates to a 
loss of about 10% of the world’s production of the major commodity 
crops20. Historical shortfalls in calorie production, much less than 
the magnitude that may occur with a sudden AMOC collapse, have 
led to price spikes, famine, civil disorder and social breakdown. Early 
warning to allow mitigation and/or adaptation is key to minimising 
the global disruption this might cause.
 
20 http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/extreme-weather-resilience-of-global-food-system.pdf
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Part II: Understanding and managing risks
Risk management and tipping points
Risks are typically managed under a simple framework (such as 
Figure 9). The risk is the combination of the probability of the hazard 
occurring (i.e. the tipping point being crossed) and its consequence21. 
However, this simple business framework may be difficult to apply, 
especially when there is great uncertainty about the probability. 
This uncertainty can arise from imperfect understanding of the 
process – poor estimates of maximum sustainable yield in Northern 
cod (Hutchings, 1996), to unwillingness to credit the evidence, such 
as climate change denial (Dunlap, 2013). Nonetheless, from an 
institutional perspective (whether a country or a business), crossing 
a tipping point may primarily be a “hazard risk”, but with impact 
on all the major classes of risk identified in the Institute of Risk 
Management framework (Figure 9).
So, what knowledge is needed to understand the “tipping point” risk? 
Firstly, there is a need to recognise that the function relied on by a 
business or country (e.g. food production, food availability, food price) 
may show “tipping point” behaviour, where a step change in function 
can occur in response to an incremental change in a variable, or an 
unprecedented perturbation. This requires us to acknowledge that we 
live in a non-linear world, where an incremental change can have a 
big effect. Acknowledging the potential of large and unprecedented 
changes is perhaps the most important initial step. Is it possible 
for the rains to change? Is it possible for the soils suddenly to lose 
functionality? Is it possible for climate to switch? 
If tipping points are acknowledged as possibilities, our suggestion is 
that we need to think through four further points for understanding 
the impact on food systems (Figure 10): 
1. Where is the system now relative to the tipping point?
2. What is the likelihood, trajectory and rate of approach to the 
tipping point?
3. What is the cost of passing the tipping point? 
4. What alternative trajectories are available (such as through 
changing farming systems, crops, emissions or demand for food)? 
 What are the direct and indirect costs associated with different 
trajectories? How long do we have the option to move between 
trajectories? When do those options close down?
In short: Does the threshold Exist? What is the Threat? What is the 
Trajectory towards the threshold? What are the Alternatives? We 
term this the “ETTA” framework.
If we have these elements of knowledge, the market, in combination 
with policy has potential to price in the costs of crossing the tipping 
point and the losses caused (including need for adaptation), or 
can price in positive actions to ensure the trajectory towards the 
threshold is avoided. Without better understanding of where we are 
relative to a threshold, institutional actors (state or non-state) tend to 
resort to putting their short-term interests first; with better knowledge 
of the threshold, actors are more likely to co-operate to bring about 
collective action (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012).
Figure 9 from https://www.theirm.org/media/886059/ARMS_2002_IRM.pdf
21 https://www.theirm.org/media/886059/ARMS_2002_IRM.pdf
Figure 10.  The “Existence, Threat, Trajectory, Alternatives” framework for 
thinking about critical thresholds.
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Forecasting the proximity to a tipping point
If action by the market or policy requires knowing the trajectory 
towards a threshold or tipping point, it suggests we need early-
warning indicators that signal our closeness to a threshold with 
sufficient time to act. Broadly, there are two kinds of indicators. 
The behaviour of many complex systems is known to change as 
they approach a tipping point. Typically, before a tip the way the 
system interacts with random events (like weather, generically termed 
“noise”) changes. Away from a tipping point, noise may simply create 
“normal variability” in the functionally important variables. As the 
system approaches the tipping point, the volatility of the system 
may increase, consistently or intermittently (so called “flickering”) 
(Greenman and Benton, 2003; Scheffer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 
2012). As well as increasing, the variability of the system may change 
its properties usually “slowing down” in frequency – so instead of 
varying above and below the average from time step to time step, 
the system spends more time on one side or other of the average 
(Lenton, 2011; Scheffer et al., 2012). Increasing volatility – as well as 
creating negative impacts in its own right – can therefore signal the 
nearness of a critical transition. 
Given that environmental variability affecting many aspects of the 
agri-food system is also likely to increase due to climate change’s 
impact on weather, the risk of a tipping point – in terms of the 
system being perturbed enough to move from one stable state to 
another (Fig 3c) – being passed also increases. Actively tracking the 
environmental variability affecting a system and the volatility of the 
system’s response may be increasingly important for diagnosing 
tipping point risks. 
In addition to diagnostic dynamical signals of the proximity to a 
tipping point, there are biophysical measurements that can indicate 
the change in a system that is likely to be detrimental. Often used 
proxies include, for example, decreasing soil carbon or soil depth, 
decreasing abundance or biodiversity of pollinator communities, 
or increasing nutrient quantity of water bodies. However, whilst 
such variables may say something in general about the state of 
the system, they do not indicate the existence of, or closeness to, a 
boundary. Such state variable therefore do not necessarily prompt 
action.
Forecasting needs to be accurate to prompt action
The existence of early warning indicators is a necessary part of 
mitigating or adapting to the tipping point. However, there is a 
significant constraint in that the value of information in such signals 
is crucially dependent on their accuracy (or their perceived accuracy). 
An interesting study, using game-theory (Barrett and Dannenberg, 
2012), suggests that uncertainty about when a critical threshold is 
passed leads to lack of consensus on action for avoiding dangerous 
climate change. We can illustrate why this is with respect to a simple 
experiment. 
Using decision theory, we can quantify the value or utility of forecast 
information by combining knowledge about our ability to forecast 
an adverse event, with an understanding of the costs and losses 
associated with the occurrence of that event, subject to different 
planning strategies (Lindley, 1985). In this approach, costs and 
losses are characterised using a 2x2 matrix whose elements are 
calculated on the basis that there are two outcomes (the adverse 
event either occurs or not) and two decisions (to plan for the adverse 
event or not). As shown in Table 1, potentially different costs or 
losses are associated with each of the four possible event/decision 
combinations. 
The adverse event occurs with probability P, known as the base rate. 
Accordingly, the probability that the event does not occur, is 1-P. The 
costs and/or losses associated with the different events are denoted 
by the Cost values, and are determined by the decision to plan or not 
plan. 
In the absence of any information other than the probability, P, of 
the event occurring, the optimal decision is the one that minimises 
the expected costs/losses. Consequently, depending on the specific 
values in the matrix and P, the decision maker should always plan 
or always not plan. This case represents the baseline losses against 
which other forecasts are measured. For example, in the limit that 
it is possible to predict the occurrence of the adverse event with 
100% accuracy, we would always be able to select the appropriate 
decision that minimises the losses. This example of perfect forecast 
information defines the maximum value of a forecast relative to the 
baseline. More generally, forecasts are never 100% accurate and, 
therefore, only provide “partial information” (this is particularly true 
in the cases we are discussing: uncertainty in both “if” and “when”). 
This information can still be of use, but its expected utility or value 
is determined by a combination of the forecast accuracy and the 
decision-maker’s cost-loss matrix. In particular, for a given cost-loss 
matrix, a forecast which correctly predicts the occurrence of the 
event more often, has greater value. Notably, however, the forecast 
only attains value, relative to the baseline, above a certain level of 
accuracy which depends on the cost-loss matrix. Figure 11 compares 
the value of a forecast as a function of its accuracy for two sets of 
Costs (i.e. values in Table 1). 
This simple approach re-emphasises that when a decision is costly, 
a forecast will be valued only if it is perceived to be trust-worthy. For 
repeated events, models can be developed iteratively and “earn” trust 
(e.g. the improving skill of weather forecasting). For one-off events, 
this is problematic since their performance at capturing tipping 
points cannot be fully assessed. 
Table 1 Event occurs Event does not occur
Plan Cost-1 Cost-2
Do not plan Cost-3 Cost-4
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If we know we are heading for a tipping point, what 
might we do differently?
The ETTA framework (Figure 10) suggests that once a potential 
tipping point’s existence has been established and the trajectory 
towards it has been verified as a threat, then it is necessary to assess 
the costs and benefits and potential of doing things differently. 
If there are no feasible alternative trajectories, then efforts can 
be made to adapt to the likely change in function, through the 
market pricing in the costs of adaptation (e.g. through insurance, 
or designing in resilience into the socio-economic system). If 
alternatives are available, policy and market actors have the 
potential to stimulate a switch from “business as usual (BAU)” to 
“business unusual” in order to ensure sustainability. This could be 
through pricing the damages of unmitigated pathways or pricing the 
adaptation costs to avoid an outcome. Whilst these are theoretically 
similar, there may be good reason to base valuations on mitigation 
cost22.
If the information is trusted and transparently available, the 
market may partly respond, though the extent to which this occurs 
will depend on the extent to which externalities are present. If 
externalities are prevalent, as they typically are in the case of 
environmental concerns, then information alone is not sufficient. 
However, there may be requirements for public policy levers to ensure 
that the market responds appropriately (whether these are regulatory 
or incentivising public investments looking for innovative solutions 
from research). In addition, consumers ultimately are a determining 
force in the functioning of the food system. Whilst consumers may 
be price-sensitive, if low prices inflate the chance of a tipping point 
(which may increase future prices, along with other indirect effects, 
such as geo-political destabilisation), consumers may be more willing 
to accept changing prices (Bailey et al., 2014). Thus, an important 
route for stimulating and supporting market change is through 
dialogue with the public about how their individual actions can help 
(i.e. “conversation science”).
As discussed above, the value of a prediction about crossing a 
tipping point depends on its accuracy, in particular the accuracy 
about when an event will happen rather than what will happen if a 
critical threshold is crossed (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). This 
uncertainty allows actors (from individuals to governments) to defer 
the cost/responsibility because the event might not happen within 
their career or administration. This, of course, leads to the challenge 
of coordinating actions to avoid conscientious actors bearing the 
costs, while less conscientious actors get the benefits. However, the 
evidence for a tipping point is likely to become stronger the closer 
it gets. Given the multiple decades it takes for research to turn into 
adopted innovation, and often similar timescales for institutional 
innovation and infra-structural development, there is a conundrum in 
creating the impetus for markets to work to stimulate mitigation; by 
the time the evidence is strong enough, perhaps there is insufficient 
time to change23. In addition, there is a particular challenge in 
assessing the likely impact of crossing such a tipping point as 
predicting the ability of any future society to adapt to such a change 
is even more difficult than predicting the physical tipping point itself. 
Identifying the discount rates that should be used in assessing the 
future costs of such tipping points requires significant further research 
and any policy recommendations based on particular discount rates 
should be treated with care. 
Finally, in determining actions in response to tipping points, it 
is clearly crucial to consider fully the potential for unintended 
consequences. Recognising the need to build resilience or mitigating 
the approach to a critical threshold may affect other aspects of 
“sustainability” or create further lock-in to the current trajectory. For 
example, if building resilience in Europe reduces productivity, and 
if demand did not change, this may cause price signals to intensify 
production elsewhere in the world, with the potential for negative 
consequences, such as undermining soil structure. This may therefore 
shift the risk of crossing a tipping point geographically, without 
significantly reducing exposure to market shocks. 
To unpack “what might we do differently” a little more concretely, we 
take two of the plausible future tipping points and discuss application 
of the ETTA framework (see Boxes 1 and 2). 
22 E.g https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/carbon-valuation-in-uk-policy-appraisal-a-revised-approach
23 This is similar to the climate change debate about “avoiding dangerous climate change”: 2 degrees Celsius as a limit was first mooted in 1975 and has been discussed up to COP21 
in Paris where it was acknowledged in the aim of not exceeding 1.5 degrees.  However, there is now little time to avoid exceeding the target (https://www.carbonbrief.org/two-degrees-
the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit).
Figure 11: value of forecast information as a function of forecast “accuracy” 
for two different cost-loss matrices. Here, forecast accuracy is quantified 
using either the definitions of hit rate or proportion correct, which range 
from 0-1. Below an accuracy of ~0.7 the forecast offers no value above the 
baseline. Above this threshold, the value increases linearly up to the maximum 
theoretical value as the accuracy tends to 1 (i.e. 100%). 
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What would we do differently: case study scenarios
Case study 1: “The East Anglian dustbowl”
Existence of tipping point: As outlined above, intensification 
creates substitution of carbon-based, organic, nutrients with 
synthetic ones; leads to loss of soil biodiversity; loss of structure; 
and increased erosion risk. At the same time, drought risk is 
changing as the climate changes. Erosion risk can be >6000 times 
greater in drought conditions than non-drought conditions. 
Threat from the tipping point: A worst case scenario would 
be a significant erosion event (or sequence of events) that 
removes large amounts of soil (and impinges upon agricultural 
productivity, which may lead to a downgrading of land 
classification and associated change in cropping patterns – such 
as switching from root vegetables to wheat). This would have 
significant impacts on the local agricultural economy (and its 
requirement for labour), both in the short and long-term. The 
local costs would not only affect those individual landowners 
whose farming practices have degraded the soils. Eroded soils 
are transported across the surface, if they are heavy, including by 
bouncing (so called saltation), or suspended in the air (the lighter 
particles). Transport of these off the farm imposes costs on others. 
Dust suspended in the air-column may have significant short-term 
economic impacts (including on health and transport). Larger 
soil particles, not suspended, can be deposited against fences 
(blocking roads) or in watercourses, creating siltation and blocking 
drains, and affecting flood risk. 
Whilst it is likely that in absolute terms a local event like an 
East Anglian dustbowl would affect a small amount of global 
production, we nonetheless note that one of the amplifying 
factors for the 2007/8 global food price spike was reduced yields, 
negligible on a global scale, from reduced Australian wheat 
production. Therefore, under some circumstances local production 
shortfalls in a limited area can interact with other factors (e.g. 
stock-to-use ratios, transport risks, weather elsewhere, geo-politics) 
to impact globally.
Trajectory: Soils are losing carbon, microbial biodiversity and thus 
structure and thus resilience; at the same time climate is changing 
making droughts more likely. Soils are much more fragile than 
previously, and droughts are increasing in frequency; currently 
the system is somewhere near but not on the threshold. Climate 
change is reducing the distance to the threshold by making 
drought and crop failure more likely and this is compounded by 
current, intensive, farming practices. Although it would require 
new research to characterise the risk of an East Anglian Dustbowl, 
new policy pressure to intensify production without mitigating 
loss of soil condition would almost certainly accelerate the 
trajectory. 
Alternatives to BAU: alternative trajectories are immediately 
available. Graves and Morris (2013) developed a model to 
estimate the rate of loss of peat and carbon for a range of 
climate change and land use scenarios (continued intensive 
arable, degraded arable, conservation grassland, and peatland 
restoration). Assuming a no climate change scenario (Box Error! 
Reference source not found.), the continued arable intensive 
scenario resulted in the most rapid loss of peat. The rate of loss 
was reduced under the improved grassland and afforestation 
scenarios, and peat depth increased under the restored peat 
scenario, with the result that there was an increase in the peat 
stock.
Costs of alternative trajectories: The market and non-market 
costs of these scenarios up to 2080 were also assessed by Graves 
and Morris (2013), using a cost benefit analysis model that 
assumed discount rates of 3.5% up to 2052 and 3% beyond 
that. They did not model the potential costs of significant 
erosion. From a farmer’s financial perspective, the income stream 
associated with continued agricultural production scenario 
was much more profitable than that associated with peat 
conservation or peat restoration scenarios, making continued 
agricultural production the preferable land use for a farmer. 
However, when the non-market externality of these scenarios 
in terms of the associated carbon loss was aggregated with 
these financial benefits, it was found under continued arable 
production scenario, that the present value of future agricultural 
income (£14,500 ha-1) was greatly in deficit to the cost of 
carbon emissions associated with that agricultural income stream 
(£47,000 ha-1). This resulted in a negative net present value of 
£33,000 ha-1. Furthermore, climate change increased the speed 
of peat degradation, decreasing the present value benefit from 
agriculture and increasing the present value costs of the soil 
carbon losses. 
The present value benefits for the peat restoration and peat 
conservation options on the other hand, whilst lower in terms 
of agricultural income, were found to be a vastly preferable use 
of fenland peats when the cost of carbon emissions were also 
included. The net present value of the aggregated net agricultural 
benefit and soil carbon emission in the peatland restoration 
scenario was £10,500 ha-1 due to the sequestration of carbon 
in the peat as the peat stock increased. Peatland conservation 
Box figure 1: Peat depth change under different land use scenarios 
assuming no climate change (from: Graves and Morris 2013).
   |   1 7
using extensive grassland management was also assumed to 
result in peat formation, providing a positive present value of 
£12,500 ha-1. The semi-intensive grassland use on the other hand 
also resulted in a much higher soil carbon emission cost then 
agricultural income benefit, and resulted in a negative present 
value of £17,000 ha-1.
Whilst this “dust bowl” is a plausible scenario, quantifying the risks 
needs research. Given a sufficiently strong evidence-base, there 
could be explicit and public agreement of the need to manage 
the fenland soils for the long term. This could be incentivised via a 
number of potential market and policy routes, for example:
• Through agri-environment schemes to compensate farmers for 
the lost income arising through alternative soil management. 
• For land and business valuations, including insurance, to 
reflect unsustainable management through changing prices or 
investment opportunities
• Government could create a Pigovian tax –which taxes an 
action that creates an externality to the same as the cost 
of the externality - to dis-incentivise unsustainable soil 
management.
• For there to be clearer signals from the (re)insurance markets 
on likely timescales until insurance becomes unaffordable/
unavailable (where the risk in any given year that the tipping 
point will be breached becomes too high for an insurance 
product to operate). 
• Through addressing the “Principal-Agent problem” in short-
term leases. This occurs when a tenant, on a short lease, is not 
interested in the value of the land, only the revenue extractable 
from it. The land agent is interested in maximising the income 
for the landowner, which, through self-interest, may not 
fully price in the cost of maintaining the soil carbon stocks. 
Addressing this might require prescriptions within tenancy 
about good stewardship.
However, additional issues will need to be considered beyond 
pure cost-benefit analysis that may impact the decisions taken 
above and the exact solutions implemented. For example, the 
social aspect of reclaiming land or changing its function is highly 
political. Farm labour, which could be adversely affected by 
such interventions, is also highly political given the dependence 
on foreign labour for some farming practices. Another political 
dimension occurs considering how land management can affect 
water quality, water availability and flood risks in urban centres 
downstream, and how to balance the risks across different 
communities. 
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Case study 2: Collapse of AMOC
Existence of tipping point: As outlined above, models suggest 
increasing greenhouse gas emissions increase the probability that 
the North Atlantic overturning circulation (AMOC) will weaken or 
switch off. This may happen over a timescale as short as a few 
years, and, whilst unlikely, it could happen over the next decades. 
Although it is a climate example, some of the key impacts of 
AMOC collapse would be on global food systems. If we could 
predict AMOC collapse, its impacts on the food system would be a 
prime motivator for action – therefore we think it is reasonable to 
address here; how could or should we respond? Applying the ETTA 
framework to AMOC collapse we know that a potential tipping 
point exists, we are uncertain about its likelihood, but we know 
that likelihood increases with the magnitude of climate change 
(Kriegler et al., 2009) and potentially also with the rate of climate 
change (Stocker and Schmittner, 1997). 
Threat from the tipping point: Regarding the threat from 
AMOC collapse, the physical climate impacts have been outlined 
above and span (at least) Europe, Central and South America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and India. Potential impacts on the global 
food system include a reduction in EU yields of approximately 
30%, 10% of losses in rice yields in India, reduction in soya and 
sugar production in Latin America, and eliminating the potential 
to produce food in large parts of the Sahel. This would amount to 
a relatively rapid, global decline in productivity of the order of tens 
of percent, which could be unprecedented (given that a 10% loss 
of global calories has been suggested to be a 1-in-200 year return 
time event). Unprecedented global losses in production are likely 
to lead to unprecedented policy and market responses, leading to 
price rises significantly greater than have ever been seen. Looking 
across the whole economy, William Nordhaus has suggested that 
AMOC collapse could cause a 25-30% reduction in global GDP 
(akin to the Great Depression but permanent), but no one really 
knows what this figure is (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). Suffice 
to say, the prospect of an order of 10% irreversible reduction in 
global GDP is sufficient to radically change the outcome of cost-
benefit analyses (Cai et al., 2015; Lontzek et al., 2015).
Trajectory: Global GHG emissions are increasing and current 
trajectories are on-course for around 4 degrees of global warming 
by the end of this century (and more warming thereafter), 
so the risk of AMOC collapse is currently increasing. Existing 
expert elicitation (Kriegler et al., 2009) suggest the probability 
of an AMOC collapse by 2200 is about as likely-as-not (i.e. 
approximately 50%) if we continue on our present (high warming) 
trajectory. Therefore, on the centennial timescale, if there is no 
decisive action to limit global GHG emissions, AMOC collapse 
24 The probability given here is not the annual probability of occurrence (which is what is more commonly used in risk assessments), rather the risk of it occurring over the time 
period.   A 10% risk of AMOC collapse prior to 2200 might mean, of course, that it happens this decade, just as it may rain today even if the forecast chance is 10%. 
25 http://www.fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Hungry-for-Change-web-27.10.pdf
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should not be seen as a “high impact-low probability” event; it 
should be viewed as a “high impact-high probability” event24. 
Alternatives to BAU: There are alternative trajectories with 
different outcomes, attendant costs and benefits. According 
to the same expert elicitation (Kriegler et al., 2009), if global 
warming were limited to around 3 degrees Celsius, the probability 
of AMOC collapse by 2200 drops to less-likely-than-not, 
approximately 20%, and if it is limited to less than 2 degrees 
Celsius, it drops to approximately 10% or less. These scenarios 
amount to different rates of decarbonising the global economy 
(with attendant costs) to get to net zero (or even net negative) 
global GHG emissions. For stabilisation at 3 degrees Celsius, 
GHG emissions need to cease around the end of this century, 
for stabilisation at 2 degrees Celsius they need to cease soon 
after mid-century and be followed by global-scale carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR) from the atmosphere (and for 1.5 degrees Celsius, 
they need to cease by mid-century and be followed by even-
more-massive CDR). Such pathways are, of course, the subject of 
intense international negotiation and national action following 
the Paris Agreement.
Whilst the larger part of such mitigation efforts concerns 
non-agricultural parts of the global economy, the agri-food 
system accounts for about a third of global GHG emissions, 
including some of the hardest to mitigate (e.g. N2O emissions). 
Furthermore the greatest economic potential for CDR lies in 
alternative land-use systems notably ‘biomass energy with carbon 
capture and storage’ (BECCS), which themselves may impinge on 
food production (such as through requiring significant land and 
water resources). Thus, the global agri-food system has a key role 
to play in determining whether AMOC collapse occurs, as well as 
suffering key impacts if it does occur, and it contains its own non-
linearities that could play a key role in determining the outcome. 
Notably, reducing carbon-intensive food in diets has considerable 
potential leverage in reducing GHG emissions (Bajzelj et al., 2014; 
Hedenus et al., 2014; Bryngelsson et al., 2016).
To follow low warming trajectories, and minimise the likelihood of 
AMOC collapse, will require markets today to recognise a relatively 
high social cost of carbon, well above that currently used in US 
Federal policy (Cai et al., 2015; Lontzek et al., 2015), which would 
require solid evidence that the benefits of avoiding the tipping 
point exceed the costs, all discounted. Were this to happen, it is 
likely to need carbon pricing on food to reflect the true cost of 
the externalities caused by food. This would incentivise changing 
demand away from carbon-intensive production and diets 
towards a low carbon lifestyle. However, such “TruCost” food 
could have undesirable consequences for the poor. Recognising 
this dilemma, the Fabian Society Commission Hungry for Change 
(2015)25 concluded, “there must be a new focus on improving 
incomes rather than keeping prices artificially low” (page 21). 
Collective anxiety about crossing a tipping point might also lead 
richer consumers to help coordinate a global shift towards less 
carbon-intensive diets (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012), changing 
social norms around meat-eating and reaping the associated 
benefits for personal health.
If action is too late or insufficient to avoid AMOC collapse, then 
the costs become those of adapting to its consequences. If this is 
retrospective action once wide-scale losses are occurring then the 
market response will lead to price being a rationing mechanism. 
The impact would therefore be greatest on the global poor, 
especially in import-dependent sub-Sharan African countries, with 
significant impacts on the local poor in every country. This would 
clearly represent more than a market failure for it transgresses 
sustainable development goals. It occurs because the externalities 
in this scenario are not marginal, and strongly suggesting that 
policy intervention is also needed in the case of AMOC collapse 
(just as it is needed to avoid AMOC collapse). 
Such policy intervention could be in advance of AMOC collapse 
occurring (even it were unavoidable) and take the form of ‘pre-
emptive adaptation’ investment to deal with changes in food 
availability. In general, the prospect of an approaching tipping 
point should lead to precautionary investments to help smooth 
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consumption (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2014). The question 
is then approaching the AMOC collapse what form could that 
investment take? The accumulation of food stocks is a very 
expensive option and one that would only ever be effective in the 
very short term. Nevertheless, until recently, China maintained 
stocks equivalent to 70% of annual consumption, partly because 
of the historical occurrence of major droughts and famines 
associated with millions of excess deaths (e.g. 1876-79, 1928-
30, 1942-43, 1959-61), and partly to protect rural incomes. 
Accumulating capital and infrastructure that enables new 
agricultural opportunities to be exploited rapidly in the event of 
AMOC collapse would seem a more long-term effective approach. 
This is predicated on the natural science understanding that 
there will be climate change winners as well as climate change 
losers in an AMOC collapse scenario – including increased 
yield potential in some regions. It will also likely require global 
coordination and associate mechanisms for redistributing capital. 
As, and when, increasing evidence for the likelihood of AMOC 
collapse is gathered, the finance community will start to build in 
the downside risks of such an event into its evidence base. There 
is likely to be a tipping point in the finance sector when this risk 
starts to be perceived as real. Particularly for AMOC collapse 
where the risk is a significant loss of global GDP, the risks to 
investment and the normal functioning of financial markets are 
so large that this tipping point in the socio-economic system is 
likely to be significant, at least in the short-term. Markets could 
respond by trying to re-value investments based on the new 
outcomes and attempt to price-in avoiding AMOC. However, the 
market imperfections and lack of timeliness that exists may make 
this very difficult and could lead to several markets crashes and 
re-alignments until market sentiment settles on what it considers 
to be the most likely outcome. 
The transfer of risk to the insurance and reinsurance markets can 
be a very efficient method of transferring potential risk to capital 
markets, however there is limited potential to transfer all risk to 
markets. Insurers typically provide cover for relatively short time 
scales, with reinsurance programmes constantly changing and 
adapting to emerging risks and market competition. Insurers 
are able to react relatively quickly following large losses, and if 
the risk is perceived to be too great (or too frequent) then cover 
can be reduced, policy holder risk retention increased, or cover 
withdrawn completely. Should this be the case then risk will be 
pushed back onto the policy holder, governments, or society as 
a whole. Insurance seeks to price risk as efficiently as possible, 
but as most insurers underwrite for a profit some residual risk will 
remain. Some products can reduce the cost of risk to very low 
levels (parametric insurance products for example) but they tend 
to deal with only a handful of perils, so should be used carefully. 
Ultimately, insurance and risk management can positively 
influence sustainable behaviour by society, but may not be 
able to effectively respond to long term changes in risk or sharp 
corrections in risk profile. 
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Conclusions
• Tipping points in environmental systems do occur.  Agri-food 
systems rely on the maintenance of function of a wide range of 
supporting systems (soil, water, climate, as well as biodiversity-
related services like pollination and natural pest suppression); 
sudden changes in function associated with tipping points in 
climate, weather, soil health or biodiversity are likely to have 
profound local effects. 
• Such tipping points matter for the food system. Extreme events – 
like widespread droughts -in the natural environment have been 
demonstrated to perturb food markets, and have contributed 
to food price spikes (in combination with other factors like 
export restrictions). Crossing an environmental tipping point has 
potential to contribute to market effects in a similar way, but with 
the “perturbation” being long-lived or even permanent. 
• Furthermore, economic systems are like natural systems in having 
feedback loops, non-linear behaviour and tipping points. We do 
not currently know enough about the interaction of biological 
and socio-economic systems to know whether they will amplify 
or damp each other’s tipping points. The present paradigm 
that trade is typically beneficial is based on assumption that an 
open trading system will dampen shocks, which is certainly true 
for small shocks. As potential shocks - from evolving weather 
and potential tipping points - increase in magnitude, frequency 
and longevity, the confidence with which this assumption is 
made may be tested. Greater research is needed to improve 
understanding of these risks.
• Early warning indicators of an approach to a tipping point can 
be increasing frequency of “extremes” (as the system “ flickers” 
close to the critical threshold) prior to the permanent change 
to a “new normal”. Even “local” tipping points (such as those 
associated with the creation of a dustbowl or a fisheries collapse) 
can contribute to supply shortfalls and potential for price spikes. 
Global scale tipping points like AMOC could change supply in an 
unprecedented way.
• The value of predictions crucially depends on their accuracy, 
and the trust placed in them. Establishing an evidence base 
supporting predictions that are trusted takes time (as shown from 
climate change mitigation negotiations). This time requirement 
may lock us in to the situation that we accept the evidence 
that something is likely to happen when the event is close-to-
happening, reducing our ability to mitigate and increasing our 
requirement to adapt.
• If predictions about time horizons are trusted, and if the pathway 
to mitigate crossing the tipping point are understood (e.g. 
whether from avoiding over-fishing, or improving “soil health” 
or de-carbonising the economy) – and if public policies do not 
distort market responses - an environmental tipping point could 
lead to smooth market response and fewer price spikes in food.
• But often the market doesn’t work to “perfectly price” and 
governments do intervene in ways that distort market responses 
(such as reducing exports during a food price spike). There is a 
clear need for the potential risks of crossing tipping points to 
be understood more widely and for consideration of potential 
actions to mitigate and adapt. There is a risk of a stand-off in 
market-policy interaction: the market expects government to carry 
the risks, and so does not cover them; whereas the government 
expects the market to work well.
• It may be possible to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in some 
depth. This might inform whether adapting to a “new normal” 
or mitigating the tipping point in advance of crossing it is 
economically preferable. However, many of the options are deeply 
political, or geo-political - in nature and it may be frequently be 
the case that the actions taken are not those predicted by a cost-
benefit analysis. 
• Nonetheless, wider consideration of the risks posed by tipping 
points might inform individuals and market actors and help 
prompt mitigating actions.  As the UK’s Climate Change Risk 
Assessment Report (2012) report concludes: “[A] risk-based 
approach, and planning properly for the long term for a range 
of futures, is a big challenge. Tackling that challenge successfully 
will allow us to protect and enhance our economy, society and 
environment both now and for future generations.”
• There are at least three reasons that underpin people’s 
willingness to make behavioural changes (e.g. to change food 
preferences to mitigate the environmental costs of production). 
Firstly if the risk is local and/or observable, secondly if it is likely to 
occur in a short timescale, and finally if their actions have direct 
impact on the risk. For example, with cod fisheries it is clear that it 
is overfishing that caused the collapse, the impact was directly on 
the livelihood of the fishers and the reduction in fish available to 
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catch was observable year on year. In this case both consumers 
and fishers find it relatively easy to understand what the issue 
is and to see how their behaviour change could have impact. 
However, with an issue such as the slowing or collapse of the 
AMOC, the event is unlikely to happen in an urgent timeframe, it 
is not immediately evident that it is happening, and it is not clear 
how an individual could improve things. The lead would need to 
come from policy or markets.
• If a tipping point is inevitable, even if we are able to predict it 
accurately and make contingency plans then there is still likely to 
be a transient period where there is a large amount of variability 
in the system which will make the food availability unpredictable. 
This is where food storage might become more cost effective in 
the medium term to smooth over those variations.
• There is no “zero sum game” (where there are no overall losers) in 
the handling of tipping points in the food system. Many people 
depend on non-sustainable food production regimes on the land 
and seas and coasts where tipping points are almost inevitable. 
To take them away from their currently viable livelihoods without 
well prepared plans for their safeguard could result in great 
injustice and possible political instability to say nothing of food 
insecurity. To address tipping points in any food system requires 
great sensitivity to risk based assessments and large amounts 
of carefully managed local participation by means which are 
demonstrably inclusive and interactive. In this setting adherence 
to sustainable development goals with all of their important 
interconnections, provides a valuable guide.
• Our discussions outlined here define a wider research agenda. 
o Whilst there is good evidence that alternative states can 
exist, both in environmental and socio-economic systems, 
and critical transitions can occur between them, there is little 
understanding about how environmental and socio-economic 
systems may respond to each other’s potential tips.
o For environmental systems, we need better knowledge of both 
whether tipping points are likely, as well as the magnitude 
of their effects and their geospatial coherence: if something 
happens to European soils, are similar drivers likely to create 
impacts in other locations?
o We need better understanding of how the proximity of tipping 
points can be predicted. These include both proxies based 
on the underlying systemic state (e.g. how does soil carbon 
inform the likelihood of strong erosive events? Or how is a 
decline in biodiversity likely to inform collapse of pollination 
services?) and also dynamic “early warning” indicators
o Given that it is easier to forecast impending doom than to act 
on the prediction, we need a more nuanced understanding 
of decision making under risk and uncertainty. This includes 
understanding better the optimal control of risks (i.e. 
minimising both risk and cost of control). 
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Glossary
• Hysteresis – hysteresis occurs when the incremental increases 
lead to the switch between states, but then incremental decreases 
do not immediately (or perhaps ever) take you back to the 
original state (see figure).
• Resilience (engineering and ecological) – Two conceptual 
definitions of resilience are widely used in systems science, 
generally referred to as ecological resilience and engineering 
resilience. Ecological resilience is based on the concept of 
(Holling, 1973) and has been defined as the capacity of a system 
to tolerate disturbance without changing to an alternative 
configuration, and is therefore important for maintaining desired 
ecosystem functions (e.g. (Myers-Smith et al., 2012)). In contrast, 
engineering resilience is based on the concept of (Pimm, 1984) 
who defined resilience as the time taken for a system to return to 
its pre-disturbed, stable “state”. Thus engineering resilience is a 
measure of the dynamics of the system in the region of a stable 
equilibrium. These definitions, however, are in a state of flux in the 
current literature (e.g. (Desjardins et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2015)).
• Resistance  – in contrast to resilient systems, resistant systems 
remain rigid and unyielding in response to increasing frequency 
and magnitude of disturbance, until they reach a point where 
they shatter – in other words, they are “brittle”, like a pane of 
glass. This might be because the system behaviour is “locked-in” 
to specific ways of working. 
Figures:  For our example, λ is the gradually changing driving variable e.g. farming intensification, x is, for example, soil quality. In the left hand graph, starting on 
the left hand side and following the arrows, as intensification is increased then the soil quality slowly decreases until the point LP when it drops significantly to 
another state. If the intensification is then decreased we cannot immediately jump back up to the original state, we have to decrease the intensification much 
more before the system recovers back to its original state. In the right hand graph it is not possible to recover because intensification cannot be reduced enough 
to allow the system to recover. Both graphs show hysteresis (graphs taken from http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/~dgonze/TEACHING/nonlinear.pdf)
• Tipping point – Tipping points occur when a system moves from 
one stable state to another, where a stable state is one that is 
resilient to small perturbations. Several types of tipping point 
have been identified from a mathematical point of view. These 
include (i) ‘noise-induced tipping’ from one basin of attraction to 
another (as per Figure 3), (ii) ‘bifurcation-tipping’ as per Figure 
4 where a basin of attraction disappears, and (iii) ‘rate-induced 
tipping’ where a critical rate of forcing causes an abrupt change. 
Within these categories one can make further distinctions, for 
example within (ii) bifurcation tipping can encompass shifts 
between alternative fixed point (“equilibrium”) attractors (“critical 
transitions”) and also transitions between e.g. a stable fixed point 
and a limit cycle (persistent oscillation), or vice versa. The former 
is more likely to be irreversible, in the sense of hysteresis (see 
below). In the real world one must also consider a different kind 
of irreversibility – that of species extinctions. 
• Value of information – quantitative assessment of monetary 
value associated with knowledge, advice or data provided to a 
given decision-maker, based on the user-specific costs and losses 
associated with different outcomes, decisions, and a judgement 
of the accuracy of the information.
Diagrams may help. Outline definition(s) and link concepts
2 4   |  
Appendix A  – examples of tipping points
Many of these examples originally derived from (Walker and Meyers, 
2004)26. 
• The Dustbowl. In the US mid-west in the 1930s, what was, 
for the time, apparently stable and productive agricultural 
production was perturbed by drought. Failure of crops, and thus 
farm enterprises, left land bare leading to significant soil erosion 
(over 20m ha of land lost up to 10cm of soil) which intensified 
the drought through surface-climate feedbacks (Donald, 2004; 
Cook et al., 2009; Fraser, 2013). Loss of functionality from erosion 
led to very long-term impacts on productivity and land value 
(Hornbeck, 2009).
• Desertification through over-grazing. In the southern Sahel*, 
rapid increase in the populations of people and livestock has 
resulted in overgrazing from the 1950s onwards, prior to which 
the local population was sustained by a stable agricultural 
system. Constant intensive grazing destroyed the rootstock of 
palatable perennial shrubs, giving way to short-lived, shallow 
rooted annuals. Subsequently, the annuals were grazed out, 
leaving a landscape of bare soil and shallow rooted unpalatable 
shrubs. Much of the topsoil, along with its nutrients, was blown 
or washed away, leaving bare rock. Silt, which settled in drainage 
areas, baked hard after rain. Roots could not penetrate this 
hard layer and no germination could occur. The grasslands 
have been replaced by desert (Sinclair and Fryxell, 1985). In a 
similar way, over-grazing in Australia’s rangelands has led, in 
places, to permanent vegetation changes*. Heavy grazing of 
the perennial grasses leaves the soil exposed. A soil crust forms, 
water infiltration decreases and soil erosion increases, with an 
associated loss of nutrients. The germination of perennial seeds 
decreases, further reducing vegetative biomass (Fernandez et al., 
2002), leading to a stable low-vegetation state.
• Salinization*. Salt typically accumulates in groundwater 
(Rengasamy, 2006), and in arid zones, the water table is often 
deep and very saline. Changes in vegetation (e.g. removal of 
deep-rooted trees to make way for agriculture) can reduce 
evapotranspiration and bring the water table upwards. If the soil 
is inundated (e.g. irrigation, seasonal rainfall) salts can be brought 
upwards by capillary action. This can lead to degradation in soil 
function if the concentrations are sufficient to impede plant 
growth. Two potential thresholds are covered in this example. First 
the threshold of the loss of sufficient deep-rooted perennials to 
raise the water table; second the amount of salt brought into the 
root zone. A historical example of salinization is the Sumerians 
in ancient Mesopotamia (Southern Iraq today) who first had 
to switch from wheat to more salt tolerant barley and lost yield 
in so doing, and then lost the ability to grow barley leading to 
civilisation collapse (Artzy and Hillel, 1988).
• Forest-savannah hysteresis. There is a significant body 
of evidence that there can be a tipping point between two 
stable ecosystems: forests and savannahs/grasslands. Both 
evapotranspiration-rainfall feedbacks (Da Silveira Lobo Sternberg, 
2001), and fire feedbacks (Hirota et al., 2011; Murphy and 
Bowman, 2012) are important. Forests tend to stimulate more 
rainfall through enhancing convection, due to their low albedo 
relative to other land-use types, and returning vast quantities 
of moisture to the atmosphere, through evapotranspiration. For 
example, air that has passed over tropical forests can produce 
twice as much rainfall as air that has not (Spracklen et al., 2012). 
If forest cover is reduced, positive feedbacks may reduce rainfall 
and hasten the transition to savannah. Forests also tend to 
suppress fires whereas grasslands ‘encourage’ fires and have 
numerous fire-adapted traits – producing a positive feedback. 
In pre-historical times, fire was the likely cause of the tip from 
forest to grassland (Hirota et al., 2011; Murphy and Bowman, 
2012). In historical times, clearance of forest for agriculture has 
been identified as the main cause for fire. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that deforestation around the Mediterranean, initiated 
largely during the Roman Empire, has contributed to the drying 
of regional climate (Reale and Shukla, 2000). Deforestation is 
also, in some cases, also linked to desertification through reduced 
precipitation and soil loss, following storms (Millán et al., 2005) . 
In addition to these impacts, changes in forest cover in tropical 
regions can alter convection patterns, stimulating rainfall on the 
crop/forest boundary (Garcia‐Carreras and Parker, 2011). Hence, 
anthropogenic deforestation can initially stimulate rainfall on the 
new cropland, but after a certain point, can also reduce rainfall 
to the detriment of both forest regeneration and productive 
agriculture.
• Over-fishing and trophic change. Rock lobsters are an 
important fishery in South Africa*. Rock lobsters are active 
predators and scavengers that, although preferring to feed 
on mussels, will eat many different animals including whelks 
(predatory snails). In areas where lobsters are abundant, they 
appear to operate as keystone predators, regulating their prey 
at relatively sparse densities, thereby allowing the establishment 
of other species such as seaweeds. Under these conditions, 
whelks cannot become numerous enough to mass-attack and 
kill lobsters. If lobsters are removed from an area, for example 
because of over-fishing or hypoxia-events, the whelks become 
common, and, in turn, suppress lobster populations – a case of 
predator-prey reversal. 
26 Some have been collected into a database: Resilience Alliance and Santa Fe Institute. 2004. Thresholds and alternate states in ecological and social-ecological systems. Resilience 
Alliance. (Online.) URL: http://www.resalliance.org/thresholds-db.  We take many examples from this database, and lightly edit their summary descriptions.  These examples are 
acknowledged by the symbol *.
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• Shifts in climate leading to change in yields. The 
regionalisation of the Mayan agricultural system provided a 
buffer against fluctuating productivity with climate variability*. 
It included a diversity of agricultural production systems, from 
high altitude to coastal plains. This allowed “spatial buffering”; if 
production was low for one product from one place, it could be 
compensated for by abundant production in other areas. The 
population of the region increased to as many as three million 
people, with high densities in the political centres. Farmers not 
only had to provide food for the growing population, but also 
had to support the costs of an elite hierarchy, investment in large 
construction, hydraulic and agricultural infrastructure, and the 
administration of growing regional domains. As the population 
increased, the marginal returns deteriorated. Regionalisation 
expanded and agricultural domains became homogenised. 
For example, the lowlands had little diversity and the clearing 
of large areas of rainforest would have reduced that diversity 
still further. Society was already under stress at the beginning 
of the 9th century when there was an abrupt shift to more 
arid conditions for approximately 200 years (800-1000 A.D.), 
an event that occurred several times during the late Holocene, 
altering ocean circulation and terrestrial climate (Hodell et al., 
1995). On uniformly low yields, the Maya could not feed its 
dense population, let alone continue to pay for other societal 
costs. Groups with little food would raid neighbouring groups to 
make up for their deficit. Population pressure, warfare and socio-
political complexity were systematically linked. The collapse was 
swift, over a few decades, with population numbers falling from 
approximately three million people down to 450,000 people. 
The larger centres such as Tikal may have lost up to 90% of 
their population.  This example shows a shift decline in both the 
ecological system (agricultural productivity) and the social system 
(human occupation) (Tainter Joseph, 1988).  
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